We consider a monopoly that sets a price and differentiated referral fees to spread product information along a simple consumer communication network (a chain). The profit-maximizing solution involves standard monopoly pricing and referral fees that provide consumers with strictly positive referral incentives. Effective price discrimination among consumers based on their positions in the chain occurs both in the case of differentiated referral fees and in the case of uniform referral fees.
referrals,
2 firms try to manage the information flow in consumer communication networks by using referral policies. A consumer referral policy is a promise made by a firm to pay its current customers rewards for referring new customers. Typically, firms offer consumers rewards in the form of cash, discounts, deposits, gift certificates, bonus points, free products or services, or entry into a lottery.
In this paper, we examine how a firm should choose its price and referral fees when it relies on consumer referrals to raise consumer awareness of its product. In particular, we ask the following questions. Is it optimal for the firm to offer referral payments? If yes, would the firm more than compensate consumers for making referrals, providing them with a positive expected net referral benefit? Or would the referral condition be binding for some consumers? Would the firm effectively discriminate among consumers based on their position in the referral chain? How would the price under referrals compare to the price set by the firm when there are no referrals? Finally, what are the welfare implications of consumer referrals?
To answer these questions, we first consider a two-step flow of communication. 3 We assume that there is one firm that can reach some consumers (called influentials or mavens) by advertising its product through mass media, and these consumers choose whether to buy the product and spread information about it to other people (called followers, imitators, or late adopters). Consumer valuations are determined stochastically. A consumer who purchases the product can at a cost refer it to one of the followers. A referral fee is paid by the firm for each referral that results in a sale.
We show that in such a model, the firm would provide influentials with a positive net referral benefit, effectively discriminating in their favor. This is consistent, for example, with the practice by Amazon to offer free products to its top reviewers (Amazon Vine members). Although at the optimal solution influentials are better off than followers, all consumers gain when monopoly supports referrals. This is because the price remains unchanged after the introduction of the referral policy, followers have an opportunity to buy the product, and influentials enjoy positive net referral benefits. Assuming that the monopoly profit without 2 Recommendations from personal acquaintances are by far the most relevant and trustworthy, compared with all other information sources, according to Nielsen's 2012 Global Trust in Advertising Survey of 28,000 Internet respondents from 56 countries. 3 The idea of a two-step communication flow was originally proposed by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) to explain the effects of the media on voting behavior. The authors found that the media directly affect only a small fraction of the population, and those tuned into the media act as opinion leaders, influencing other voters' behavior. referrals exceeds the cost of referral, the firm would choose to support referrals, and this would result in a Pareto improvement.
Clearly, product information can propagate for several steps in a consumer communication network. Using the framework of Jun and Kim (2008) , we assume that one firm sells a product to a finite chain of n consumers. A consumer receives a referral fee if the consumer's referral of the next-in-line consumer to the product results in that consumer's purchase. The monopoly firm can choose a price and the referral fees it pays for successful referrals. Jun and Kim (2008) look at the case where the firm sets a common referral fee to all consumers. In contrast, we assume that a firm could set differential referral fees for early and late adopters. 4 Would a firm provide higher expected referral payments to consumers who buy earlier? We find that this is the case. When the firm can charge different referral fees based on consumers' positions (the case of differentiated referral fees), both the probability of purchase and the expected referral payment are decreasing along the referral chain (Theorem 1). The result is intuitive. The last consumer (consumer n) cannot make a referral, and her purchase of the product and referral do not generate extra sales. The second-to-last consumer's purchase has an externality since her purchase may lead to consumer n's purchase, but the externality is limited only to sales made to her successor. For consumers positioned earlier in the chain, the externality is larger. That is, early buyers are more valuable to the firm than later buyers since their purchase of the product is necessary for the referral chain to continue, and the potential gains from a longer chain are larger.
This intuition is the same as in the case of uniform referral fees studied by Jun and Kim (2008) , in which the firm has to set a common price p and referral fee r for all consumers. Since in their framework n purchase probabilities need to be controlled by two policy tools p and r, finding an optimal choice of (p, r) can be a highly nonconvex problem with multiple local maxima. Two qualitatively different referral equilibria could arise here. The one described by Jun and Kim (the nonstationary outcome) is characterized by a nonbinding referral condition, unequal probabilities of purchase, and price discrimination among consumers. The other one (the stationary outcome) involves a binding referral condition, equal probabilities of purchase, and no price discrimination among consumers.
This means that although intuitively it may be beneficial for the firm to effectively discriminate between consumers based on their positions in the chain, the stationary outcome is another plausible candidate for the optimal solution in the case of uniform referral fees. With their unusual tie-breaking rule, Jun and Kim (2008) assume away the stationary outcome. 5 We revisit the problem of Jun and Kim in Appendix B, where we prove that such a stationary outcome is not optimal in the case of uniform referral fees.
In sum, we show that both in the case of differentiated referral fees and in the case of uniform referral fees, the firm would choose to discriminate between consumers based on their positions in the communication chain and would provide positive expected net referral benefits to all consumers in a position to refer. Despite the simplicity of the model, the proofs are rather involved. Techniques developed in this paper may be useful for other purposes.
The next section is devoted to the simplest problem: the influentials-andfollowers model, in which only influentials are in a position to refer and collect referral fees. We analyze the case of differentiated referral fees for a chain of any finite length in Section 3 and conclude in Section 4. Appendix A contains proofs of all the statements for the case of differentiated referral fees. In Appendix B, we present results for the case of uniform referral fees.
Influentials-and-Followers Model (n = 2)
In this section, we consider a two-step model of communication, in which influentials (informed by the firm through advertising) can buy the product and recommend it to other potential consumers. While the problem is interesting in its own right, it also provides some intuition for the general case of consumer chain networks of length n ≥ 2, presented in the next section. As we restrict the number of referrals to one, 6 we can normalize the number of influentials and followers to one and refer to them as consumer 1 and consumer 2.
The firm chooses a price p ≥ 0 and referral fee r ≥ 0 to maximize its profits from selling a product it produces at a marginal cost c ≥ 0. Each consumer's willingnessto-pay v is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from a twice continuously differentiable distribution function F(v) over [ , ] v v with density function f(v). Denote by α k 5 Jun and Kim (2008) assume that if a consumer is indifferent between making and not making a referral, then she will not make a referral. This tie-breaking rule is convenient since it directly implies that consumers make referrals if and only if there are positive incentives for referral (their Proposition 2). Thus, a stationary outcome is ruled out as it is not compatible with active referrals. Here, we are assuming a tie-breaking rule that allows for referrals to be given in the stationary outcome. That is, we assume that if a consumer is indifferent between making and not making a referral, she refers. 6 The analysis and results are similar when this assumption is relaxed. See Section 4 for the discussion. the probability that consumer k buys the product conditional on being introduced to it, k = 1, 2. Consumers need to pay a cost ρ > 0 to make one referral, which yields a referral fee r if it results in a sale. Consumers make their purchase and referral decisions to maximize their expected utility. We assume that when indifferent between making and not making a referral, consumers refer. That is, consumer 1 refers whenever the referral fee r times the probability that consumer 2 buys by referral α 2 is at least as large as the cost of referral:
(α) be the standard demand and inverse demand functions. We assume that the profit function without referrals, π(α)≡α(P ( ) be the associated monopoly price and profit. We will assume that π m > ρ, which (according to Proposition 1 below) guarantees that the firm supports referrals by ensuring that α 2 r ≥ ρ.
When consumer 1 purchases the product and makes a referral, she obtains a payoff of v-p+α 2 r-ρ, which combines the net benefit of purchase, v-p, and the (expected) net benefit of referral, α 2 r-ρ. This means that consumer 1's probability of purchase is
Consumer 2, who is not in a position to refer, obtains a payoff of v-p from purchasing the product, and therefore consumer 2's probability of purchase is α 2 = Pr(v ≥ p) = D(p) ≥ 0. We will refer to P(α 1 ) = p-α 2 r+ρ as the effective price of consumer 1 and say that the firm effectively price discriminates in favor of consumer 1 if P(α 1 ) < P(α 2 ) = p.
The firm chooses a strategy (p, r) to maximize its profits 
The two formulas for profits in (1) differ in the way referral payments rα 1 α 2 are assigned as the firm pays consumer 1 for enabling a sale to consumer 2. In the first line of (1), the firm's net profit margin from consumer 1 (p-c) is higher than the net profit margin from consumer 2 (p-r-c) because of consumer 2's acquisition cost -the referral fee r paid for each successful referral. But since the referral payments are made to consumer 1, the firm ends up receiving (p-c-rα 2 ) from a sale to consumer 1 and (p-c) from a sale to consumer 2 [the second line of (1)].
From the expressions for α 1 and α 2 ,
and 2 1 2 ( ) ( ) .
We can then write the profits of the firm that supports referrals as a function of only α 1 and α 2 :
The optimal α 2 maximizes π(α 2 ) = (P(α 2 )-c)α 2 . Importantly, it does not depend on α 1 . Provided that the firm supports consumer referrals, it follows from (4) 
Strict concavity of π(α) = (P(α)-c)α guarantees that the first-order conditions for α 1 and α 2 describe the unique profit-maximizing solutions. A comparison of optimization problems for α 1 and α 2 reveals that the firm receives an additional benefit from extending sales to influentials. This is because the firm can receive profits from followers only if influentials buy and refer. The additional marginal benefit (the externality) from sales to influentials is π m -ρ > 0, which is the net profit from followers, conditional on them being informed. Due to the externality, influentials buy more often than followers at the optimal solution [0, 1] , the optimal referral fee and expected referral payment decrease in production cost.
Proposition 1 states that the presence of consumer referrals does not affect the price in this model. The price is the standard monopoly price p m , which increases with the marginal cost c and is independent of the referral cost ρ. The price is determined solely by the last (second) consumer's demand, independently of referral cost ρ, because in this simple model of two consumers, the firm has two instruments (p and r) to control two demand levels α 1 and α 2 . The firm sets the price at the optimal level for the last consumer (who does not refer). The firm does not adjust its price from the monopoly level in order to control referral activity because it can do so directly by adjusting the referral fee.
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Both influentials and followers are better off when referrals exist because there is no price change, followers have an opportunity to purchase the product, and influentials receive positive net benefits from giving referrals. Assuming π m > ρ, the firm also benefits from referrals since it can earn a positive additional expected profit on top of the monopoly profit from consumer 1. In other words, referrals result in a Pareto improvement unless referral costs are so large that sales to followers are unprofitable.
When the costs of production and/or referral increase, the firm's sales become less profitable. As a result, the firm chooses to reduce purchase probabilities. If the referral fee stays the same, this decreases the expected referral payments that influentials receive from referring followers to the firm. What happens to the referral fee as costs change generally depends on the shape of the distribution of consumer valuations.
Assuming that demand is not too convex, 8 the firm compensates influentials for the higher cost of referral with a higher referral fee and expected referral payments. However, the compensation is not full because it is always the case that referral incentives (i.e., net referral benefit 2 r α ρ * * − ) decrease with referral cost.
At least in the case of the uniform distribution of valuations, the referral fee decreases in production cost. In this case, when the cost of production increases, the expected referral payments and referral incentive decrease for two reasons: because followers are less likely to buy the product and because the referral fee is lower.
Differentiated Referral Fees for a Finite Chain Network
We maintain the modeling assumptions of the two-step communication model, extending it to the case of a communication chain of length n ≥ 2. That is, we 7 As we will show in the next section, this property holds in the case of differentiated referral fees even when there are n consumers. However, it does not extend to the case of uniform referral fees analyzed by Jun and Kim (2008) because in that case the firm has only two instruments (p and r) to control demand levels of n consumers. 8 Although we analyze a monopoly problem, the condition is exactly the same as the condition for strategic substitutes in the Cournot oligopoly problem.
assume that the first consumer is informed by the firm about the firm's product and referral policy. If consumer 1 buys the product, she can refer consumer 2 to the firm and collect referral payments, provided consumer 2 buys the product. When all consumers buy and refer, the information is passed on along the chain of consumers until the last consumer (consumer n) is reached. However, at each step, the communication chain can break down if a consumer does not buy or refer. Suppose a firm can set referral fees conditional on consumer location in the communication network. That is, the policy tools are p and r 2 , …, r n , where r k is the referral fee that consumer k-1 receives if consumer k purchases the product following her referral. Consumer k's probability of purchase when she is informed about the product is determined by the firm's policy as follows:
Consumer k's purchase probability α k depends on consumer (k+1)'s purchase probability α k+1 since consumer k takes the expected net benefit from referral rα k+1 -ρ into account when she makes her purchase decision.
The monopoly profit with active consumer referrals is
From the expressions for purchase probabilities, we find that
and 1 ( ) ( )
(α). We can then describe the problem in terms of α k s only. The firm's profit can be written as
.
Let k α * denote the profit-maximizing probability of buying for consumer k, k = 1, …, n. It is easy to see what the optimal probability of buying is for consumer n. Taking the first-order condition with respect to α n , we obtain
Since we assume that π(α n ) = (P(α n )-c)α n is strictly concave in α n , the secondorder condition is satisfied, and there is a unique profit-maximizing . m n α α * = This implies that for any n the optimal monopoly price is p * = p m as long as α k > 0 for k = 1, …, n-1. This observation is quite sensible: no matter how many consumers there are, the last consumer does not make a referral, and the firm should charge the monopoly price for her. The main results for the optimal monopoly policy are stated in Proposition 2. As in the influentials-and-followers model, the firm sets the standard monopoly price (the optimal price it would set if it were to sell to the last consumer) because referral incentives and purchase probabilities of the preceding consumers can be controlled by differentiated referral fees. Assuming π m > ρ, the firm finds it profitable to support consumer referrals by providing positive net referral benefits to all consumers who could potentially refer (i.e.
The expected payoffs of all consumers increase as well, except when they remain inactive in the market due to low values. Consumers located earlier in the communication network create higher externality for the firm in terms of future sales. Therefore, the firm effectively discriminates in favor of consumers located earlier in the chain by providing them with higher expected referral payments (i.e. 2 2 3 3 n n r r r α α α ρ * * * * * * > >…> > ) and payoffs. Probability of purchase declines along the referral chain (i.e. 1 2 n α α α * * * > > > … ). The formal proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix A, but we provide a sketch of the proof here. To prove Proposition 2, we analyze the problem where k consumers are left in the chain and solve it recursively by backward induction. Let V(k) be the optimal profit from the last k consumers, and let γ * (k) be the profit-maximizing purchase probability of the kth to last consumer. Since γ
, the expected profit from the last consumer reached by referral is the simple monopoly profit, V(1) = π m . The optimal solutions V(k) and γ * (k) when k consumers are left in the chain can be defined recursively:
and
for k ≥ 2. Lemma 1 shows that the optimal purchase probability for the kth to last consumer γ
for all k, assuming the optimal profit is increasing with the number of consumers left, i.e.
Under the assumption of an increasing profit sequence, we can use Lemma 1 to characterize the optimal purchase probability sequence:
k n k α γ * * = − + for any fixed n ≥ 2 and all k = 1, …, n because the kth consumer from the top is the (n-k+1)th consumer from the bottom.
Then, for all n, under the optimal strategy, the probability of purchase declines along the referral chain: Lemma 2 is proved by induction in Appendix A. There we suppose that V(k) > … > V(1). Then, looking at the monopoly problem with k+1 consumers, we show that the firm can achieve higher profits V(k+1) > V(k) if it applies the optimal policy for k to the first k consumers and provides consumer k with just enough incentives to make a referral to consumer k+1 (which is profitable because π m > ρ and consumer k+1 will face the monopoly price). This proves that V(k) is an increasing sequence. Putting together Corollary 1 and Lemma 2, we conclude that As expected, the firm sells less and has lower profits when referral and production costs increase. The firm favors lower referral and production costs. Since the optimal price is the standard monopoly price p As the production cost c increases, the firm's profit margins from all consumers shrink. As usual, the firm chooses to sell less, which reduces referral incentives for k = 1, …, n-1. We find that when consumer valuations are uniformly distributed, the firm also lowers all referral fees 1 , k r * + which further reduces referral incentives and the expected referral payments.
From Proposition 2 we know that the expected referral benefits Figure 1 plots the optimal profits starting at the kth consumer (when there are n-k+1 consumers left in the chain), V(n-K+1). As expected, the profits increase with the number of consumers left in the chain, V(1) < V(2) < … < V(5). Figure 1 also shows that the purchase probability , referral fees are shown to increase with referral cost for all consumers (Figure 2 ), the purchase probabilities always decrease in referral cost (Proposition 3). The overall impact of referral cost on the expected referral payments depends on the consumer's location in the communication network.
Conclusion
With the advancement of Internet technology, data on consumer positions in social networks become more easily available. Firms can now identify influential persons within a network with greater precision. Indeed, Google and Microsoft, among other companies, have obtained patents on systems for identifying nodes in social networks for more targeted ad delivery. 9 Firms should then utilize this new capability of targeting specific consumers in social networks to effectively discriminate between consumers based on their position in the network. Our paper suggests how referral fees should be set in this case. Importantly, we find that the firm discriminates in favor of more influential customers.
In the two-step model of communication, as well as in the case of differential referral fees, we find that the standard monopoly price is preserved. The result is important because it implies that there is no downside to consumer referrals. If a firm supports consumer referrals, it always benefits consumers as well. This is in contrast with the results obtained by Jun and Kim (2008) for the case of uniform referral fees. They assume that the price of the product is nondiscriminatory, and the referral fee is constant no matter where a consumer is located on the chain. In their case, the price is affected by the presence of referrals, and only partial price discrimination can be achieved because of the limited number of tools at the firm's disposal.
In the case of differentiated referral fees, intuitive comparative statics results arise. Since the price is set at the standard monopoly level, it is increasing in the marginal cost and independent of the referral cost and chain length. This is again in contrast with the results obtained by Jun and Kim (2008) for the case of uniform referral fees. Using numerical simulations, they show that the optimal product price is nonmonotonic in chain length and referral and production costs. Additionally, we find that higher production and referral costs prompt the firm to reduce buying probabilities. The firm reduces consumer referral incentives when referral cost increases and, at least for the uniform distribution of values, referral fees decrease in production cost.
In Appendix B, we revisit the case of uniform referral fees by Jun and Kim (2008) . We strengthen Jun and Kim's findings by showing that even if we allow for the stationary outcome to arise, it cannot be optimal, even locally. The solution for the case of uniform referral fees is therefore qualitatively similar to our solution for the case of differentiated referral fees. In both cases, a consumer who has a longer chain of followers buys more often. Such a consumer obtains higher expected net referral benefit and payoff. The firm is effectively price-discriminating in favor of consumers located earlier in the chain.
Although we restrict our attention in this paper to a simple chain network, the methods developed here can be applied to more general communication networks. For example, we can extend the model by allowing consumers to make multiple referrals, with heterogeneous quotas for different consumers. As long as the consumer network is a finite tree, our main results continue to hold. As in this paper, backward induction would need to be used to derive the optimal policy for the firm.
If we allow the firm to make a decision about the intensity of advertising, it is clear that the firm would advertise more when the profit from the referral chain is larger. The firm's profit would be higher when the production and referral costs are lower and the consumer chain is longer. Hence, if it becomes cheaper to make referrals (perhaps due to the advent of a new social media technology), firms would advertise more and reach more consumers through referrals. In the model, mass advertising is not displaced by more efficient consumer referrals. Instead, traditional advertising is more beneficial when profits from consumer referral chains increase due to a lower referral cost.
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It would be interesting to combine the above observations with targeted advertising. Among other applications, Galeotti and Goyal (2009) consider a problem of targeted advertising by monopoly on a general consumer communication network. They show that in its advertising strategy, the firm should target the marginalized consumers (those who seek information from few people) and influentials (consumers who inform many people). This is intuitive because the marginalized consumers are not likely to be informed by word-of-mouth, while influentials have a higher network value in terms of the future sales they generate. In the context of a chain referral model, this suggests that when targeted advertising is feasible, the firm would advertise more to consumers located earlier in the chain.
10 Suppose that by spending C(x), the firm can reach a fraction x of consumers through advertising. Then, the firm's profits are ( ) ( ), xV n C x Π= − where V(n) is the optimal profit for a consumer chain of size n, given referral and production costs ρ and c. Since V(n) is increasing in n and decreasing in ρ and c, it follows immediately that the firm would choose to advertise more when the consumer chain size n is higher and referral and production costs ρ and c are lower.
In the spirit of the models with opinion leaders and followers, in this paper we did not consider the possibility of the same person being reached through both advertising and referrals. When consumers can receive multiple advertisements and/or referrals, the issue of congestion has to be carefully addressed. Anderson and de Palma (2009) , among others, study congestion in advertising messages, and Arbatskaya and Konishi (2013) consider congestion in consumer referrals. It would be also interesting to extend the model by allowing consumer referrals to be targeted. Since consumers would choose to refer their most promising contacts, this would make referrals more efficient and in turn increase the benefits of advertising. We leave such analyses for future work.
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and 2 1 2 1
Assuming this condition on demand holds, as in the case of the uniform distribution of values, we find that 0.
For the uniform 
Proof of Lemma 1. Strict concavity of π(α) = α(P(α)-c-ρ) implies that the marginal revenue MR(α) = (αP(α))′ = P(α)+αP′(α) is decreasing and guarantees that the second-order conditions are satisfied for any k ≥ 2 in the optimization problem (12) and when we maximize π(α). We take four steps to prove Lemma 1. 1. Consider a chain of length n = 1. The profit-maximizing solution γ
the optimal solution γ * (2) is characterized by the following first-order condition γ * (2):
is decreasing, and
and the first-order condition for γ
The first-order condition for γ 
where ( 1) h k h α γ * * = − + for all h = 1,…,k. Let's look at the monopoly problem with k+1 consumers. Consider the following policy for the firm: set the same purchase probabilities for the first k consumers as in the k-consumer problem (i.e. h h α α * = for all h = 1,…,k) and make the kth consumer just willing to make a referral to the last (k+1)th consumer (by setting the expected referral benefit equal to the referral cost:
the monopoly profit under such a policy is
is the unconditional probability that the kth consumer purchases the product. Assuming π 
 by the envelope theorem for k = 2,…,n. Since
Totally differentiating the above, we obtain
From the second-order condition for profit maximization, 2P′(γ * (k))+γ * (k)P″(γ * (k)) < 0 holds, and we conclude that
We use similar arguments to derive the comparative statics result for referral cost ρ. First,
> and we can conclude that (1) 0
From Proposition 2, the optimal price is p * = p m , and therefore it decreases in production cost c but is independent of referral cost ρ. Finally, from (8), 1 ( ). Solving this, we have 1
As is easily verified, k r * is increasing in k α * as long as < for k = 2,…,n. Together, these results imply that the expected referral payments k k r α * * are decreasing in production cost for any k = 2,…,n. □
Appendix B: The Case of Uniform Referral Fees
Following Jun and Kim (2008) , let us consider the case where the firm has to set a common referral fee and price for all consumers, regardless of whether they are early or late adopters. Jun and Kim show that when the second-to-last consumer has a strictly positive referral benefit, r(1-F(p)) > ρ (their referral condition RC), the earlier a consumer is located in the chain, the higher is her probability of purchasing the product α 1 > α 2 > … > α n (their Proposition 1). This result further implies effective price discrimination among consumers according to their position in the referral chain: although the firm charges a common price p and pays a referral fee r to all consumers, the firm effectively discriminates in favor of consumers located earlier in the chain because these consumers obtain higher expected benefits from making referrals. We take a closer look at the optimal strategy of the firm. In particular, we examine the possibility of a stationary outcome being optimal. We allow for referral equilibrium to be consistent with a binding referral condition r(1-F(p)) = ρ by assuming that when indifferent, consumers make referrals. We show that the firm's profit can be improved by increasing both p and r in a right proportion starting from the optimal stationary outcome, implying that the stationary outcome is not even a local maximum for any finite n (Proposition B1). This result strongly justifies Jun and Kim's analysis and also implies that at least for large finite n, the optimal solution is perhaps very close to the stationary outcome.
Denote by α k the probability that consumer i buys the product conditional on being introduced to it, k = 1,…,n. The firm chooses a strategy (p, r) to maximize its profits 
where α 1 ,…,α n are determined by (p, r) as follows:
demand function. We assume that the profit function without referrals, π(α)≡α(P(α)-c), is strictly concave. Assuming rα k ≥ ρ for k = 2,…,n, probabilities α 1 ,…,α n , are determined by the following system of equations: 
and α 1 ≥ … ≥ α n . Suppose that the referral condition is binding for the kth consumer: rα k+1 = ρ for some k = 1,…,n-1. Then, P(α k ) = p, and we have P(α 1 ) = P(α 2 ) = … = P(α n ) = p and α 1 = α 2 = …=α n . This is a stationary outcome, for which consumer referral conditions are all binding: rα k+1 = ρ for all k = 1,…,n-1. We will show that this outcome is not locally optimal. The firm's profit can be written in terms of α k s only:
where (α 1 ,…,α n ) is a solution to system (22). Under the stationary outcome α 1 = … = α n-1 = α n = α, the profit when there are n ≥ 1 consumers can be written as
where
and π(α) = α(P(α)-c).
Denote the optimal stationary policy for an n-consumer chain by ( ) arg max ( , , , ; ). n n α β Π α α α ≡ … Proposition B1 states that β(n) cannot be a local maximum for small ρ.
Proposition B1. The optimal stationary policy β(n) is not the optimal policy if π( β(n)) > ρ.
To prove Proposition B1, we will show that the firm's profit is locally improvable [starting from β(n)] by choosing an appropriate policy change (dp, dr) > > 0. We first provide a sketch of the proof of Proposition B1. First, in Lemma B1, we investigate the properties of the optimal stationary policy β(n). Then, we look at the profit function evaluated at the optimal stationary policy α 1 = … = α n-1 = α n = β(n). We show that there is some M (1 ≤ M < n) such that profits increase with purchase probability for consumers located before M and decrease with purchase probability for consumers located after for all k > M (Lemma B2). We then show that there exists a policy change dΔ = (dp, dr) > > 0 such that for any M (1 ≤ M < n) the probability of buying increases for consumers located before M and decreases for consumers located after M. We prove this by showing that, starting at α 1 = …=α n = α, if α n decreases while α M is kept constant, dα k > 0 for all k < M and dα k < 0 for all k > M (Lemma B3). Using Lemmas B2 and B3, we conclude that the optimal stationary policy is not a local maximum. We prove Proposition B1 by using a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma B1.
(i) For all n and all α such that π(α)-ρ > 0, Π(α, α,…,α; n+1) > Π(α, α,…,α; n).
(ii) The optimal stationary solution β(n)≡arg max α Π(α,α, …,α; n) satisfies the following condition:
( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ( )) 
This proves (ii). Finally, using (26), we find that at α = β(n) 
Hence, if α = β(n) > 0 and π(β(n))-ρ > 0, then β(n+1) > β(n). Since β(1) = α m > 0, it follows that π′(α) < 0 for all α > β(1). Thus, π(β(1)) > π(β(2)) > … > π(β(n)) holds, and we conclude that β(1) > β(2) > … > β(n) if π(β(n))-ρ > 0. □ Notice that the profit Π(α 1 , α 2 ,…,α n ; n) in equation (23) 
Using these formulas, we prove the following result. 
Thus, at α 1 = α 2 = … = α n = α,
n n n P d dp P d dp dr rd P d dp dr rd When p is increasing (dp > 0), we necessarily have 1 0.
We choose (dp, dr) > > 0 such that dα M = 0. From 
( 1 ) (1 )0,
n M n M P d dp dr rd dp dr x rxd dp dr x x rx d dp dr x x x dp dp x x dr x x α α α α 
it follows that dα M = 0 implies 1
